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Hoffmann: The Dark World of Interpreting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act:

THE DARK WORLD OF INTERPRETING THE FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
ARGUMENTS, CASES AND CRITIQUES ILLUMINATING
WHETHER EMPLOYEES OF STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES
ARE "FOREIGN OFFICIALS"
ChristopherHoffinann*
I. INTRODUCTION

Forged in the post-Watergate era's furor to remove corruption, the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act ("FCPA" or the "Act") stands as Congress' response to a 1976 Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") report wherein more than four hundred corporations admitted
to bribing foreign officials.1 When Congress passed the FCPA the following year, President
Carter's signing statement indicated he shared
Congress' belief that bribery is "ethically
2
repugnant and competitively unnecessary.",
Judicial scrutiny of the FCPA remains elusive.3 In many cases, the government is
left to determine the FCPA's meaning through its prosecution theories. 4 The government has
theorized that the term "instrumentality" within the definition of "foreign official"
encompasses state owned enterprises ("SOEs").' This notion expands FCPA liability beyond
the bribery of traditional government officials.
Recently, some FCPA defendants have questioned this prosecution theory by
challenging the government's interpretation of "foreign official." The reason is clear: if the
Act did not apply to the bribery of SOE employees, the government could not prosecute this
type of bribery under the FCPA. Consequently, a defendant's success on this issue would
limit prosecutable conduct under the FCPA.
This note is meant to encourage FCPA defendants to raise "foreign official"
challenges. Thoroughly examining the sparse case law on this issue can assist future FCPA
defendants to improve their arguments, avoid prior pitfalls, and increase the potential for
success on this debatable issue.
Section 11provides background information on FCPA ambiguity and enforcement
trends. Section III examines the general legal arguments made in support and against
*
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' Jennifer Dawn Taylor, Comment, Ambiguities in the ForeignCorrupt PracticesAct: Unnecessary
Costs ofFightingCorruption,61 LA. L. REV. 861, 862 (2001).
2 Jimmy Carter, Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill; Statement on Signing § 305 into
Law, 2 PuB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977) available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7036.
3 Mike Koehler, The Faqade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L. 907, 909 (2010).
4

Id.

5 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006) (amended 1998).
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"instrumentality" encompassing SOEs. Differences in approaches and responses in the cases
are noted. Section IV explores the pertinent individual cases and court decisions. Section V
consists of observations and suggestions for future FCPA defendants to present stronger
arguments on this matter.
I1.BACKGROUND
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions prohibit "corruptly" paying, offering to pay,
promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money, a gift, or "anything of value" to a
"foreign official" in order to "obtain or retain business." 6 The FCPA applies to United States
("U.S.") companies, 7U.S. citizens, foreign companies filing with the SEC, or any person
within U.S. territory.
Ambiguity is the legislation's major flaw.8 Key terms such as "corruptly," "anything
of value," and "obtain or retain business" remain undefined. Even where a term is defined, the
value is minimal. The FCPA defines the term "foreign official" as:
[Any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of
any such government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or
on behalf of any such public international organization.9
Ambiguity exists in the term "foreign official" because the term "instrumentality"
within the definition remains undefined. Without judicial guidance, the government bases its
prosecution theories on its own interpretation of the term "foreign official."
Initially, opportunities for judicial interpretation of the FCPA arose infrequently.
For the first twenty-five years the FCPA existed the government barely enforced the law.10
The SEC and Department of Justice ("DOJ") pursued approximately two cases per year."
Internationally, the U.S. received little anti-bribery support until the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") in 1997.12
Since 2004, FCPA enforcement by both the DOJ and the SEC has increased
dramatically. In 2009 alone, the amount of the DOJ's FCPA cases was thirteen times its 2003
level. 3 This increase is no accident. In 2010, Former Assistant Attorney General Lanny A.

6

Foreign CorruptPractices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006) (amended 1998).

7id.
8

See Taylor, supra note 1, at 861 ("[T]he legislation ambiguously defines prohibited conduct and its

provisions lack an adequate standard by which to determine the nature of contemplated activity.").
' Foreign CorruptPractices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006) (amended 1998).
10 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign CorruptPracticesAct - 1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO
INT'L L.J. 89, 103 (2010).
IId.
'2 James D. Painter, The New UK Bribery Act What U.S. Lawyers Need to Know, 82 PA. B.A. Q. 172, 172
(2011).
13 Bixby, supranote 10, at 105.
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Breuer remarked that the country is in a "new era of FCPA enforcement" and
that "[the
14
DOJ's] FCPA enforcement is stronger than it's ever been - and getting stronger."
In 2009, defendants in United States v. Nguyen (the "Nguyen defendants") brought
the first motion to dismiss the alleged FCPA violations against them based on the argument
that SOE employees were not "foreign officials" under the Act. A year later, defendants in
United States v. Esquenazi (the "Esquenazi defendants") brought a similar motion.
Subsequently, similar motions by defendants in Aguilar v. United States (the "Lindsey
defendants"), Carson v. UnitedStates (the "Carson defendants"), and O 'Shea v. UnitedStates
(the "O'Shea defendant") followed. With these recent cases, courts have begun unraveling
ambiguity in the term "foreign official" and deciding whether the FCPA applies when bribery
targets SOE employees.
111. GENERAL LEGAL ARGUMENTS
A. Defendants' Arguments and the Government's Responses
i. Ordinary Meaning
In the absence of a definition, courts construe a statutory term in accordance with its
ordinary meaning.15 The term "instrumentality" within the definition of "foreign official"
remains undefined. Dictionaries may help courts ascertain a term's ordinary meaning. 16
Black's Law Dictionary defines "instrumentality" as "[a] thing used to achieve an end or
purpose" or "[a] means or agency through which a function of another entity is accomplished,
such as a branch of a governing body." 17 Webster's 11 New College Dictionary defines
"instrumentality" as "[t]he quality or state of being instrumental. 18 In turn, "instrumental" is
defined as "serving as a means or agency: implemental" or "of, relating to, or done with an
instrument or tool." 19 The Carson court understood these definitions to mean that the term

Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Speech at the 24th National Conference on the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16,2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/20l0/crmspeech-101116.html. Mr. Breuer departed from the office of Assistant Attorney General on March 1st, 2013.
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer Announces Departure from
Department of Justice (Jan. 30, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-ag128.html.
15 See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) ("A fundamental canon of statutory construction is
that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." (citing Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575, 580-581 (1975))); Johnson v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 1265,
1270-71 (2010) (construing "physical force" in the Armed Career Criminal Act's definition of "violent felony"
as meaning "violent force." (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144-145 (1995))); Smith v. United
States, 508 U. S. 223, 228 (1993) (construing firearm "use" as trading firearms for drugs).
16 See, e.g., FCC v. AT & T Inc., 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1182 (2011) (consulting dictionaries to construe "personal"
as not applying to artificial "persons" like corporations).
14

17 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
12

870 (9th ed. 2009).

WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 589 (3rd ed. 2005). In the

Aguilar case, the Lindsey defendants

offered and the court adopted this definition of "instrumentality."
19 Id.
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"generally refers to something that is used to achieve an end-an intermediary or means
through which something is accomplished. ' 2°

Although they all attempt to resolve the ordinary meaning of "instrumentality," most
FCPA defendants avoid or castigate its dictionary definition. 21 The Nguyen and Esquenazi
defendants avoided dictionary consultation in favor of examining the FCPA's overall
purpose. 22 The O'Shea defendant called dictionary definitions of "instrumentality"
unhelpful.23 The Carson defendants dismissed dictionary usage as unavailing and, if applied,
would "largely beg the question." 24 Instead, the Carson defendants stated that
"instrumentality," as used plainly in the statute, does not encompass SOEs. 25 Only the
Lindsey defendants offered dictionary definitions of "instrumentality," which the court
readily adopted.26 This stands in stark contrast to the DOJ's dictionary usage, which states
that "instrumentality" unambiguously refers to an entity achieving a government end or
purpose.27
ii. Structure and Purpose
Courts are also aware that the structure and purpose of the statute requires
interpretation. 21 In the context of the FCPA, the purpose of the statute undoubtedly concerns
bribery. The issue lies in the extent of the bribery prohibited.
United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, *4 (C. D. Cal. 2011).
"1 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 5-6,
20

United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-CR-522-TJS, (E. D. Pa. 2009) [hereinafter Nguyen Defendants' Motion];
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 4-5,
United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-CR-21010-JEM, (S. D. Fl. 2010) [hereinafter Esquenazi Defendants'
Motion]; Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment;
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 11-12, United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077JVS, (C. D. Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Carson Defendants' Motion]; Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to
Dismiss the First Superseding Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; [Proposed] Order (Filed
Under Separate Cover) at 6-8, United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 10-CR103 1) [hereinafter Lindsey Defendants' Motion]; Defendant O'Shea's Opposed Motion to Dismiss Counts One
Through Seventeen of the Indictment at 3, United States v. O'Shea, No. 09-CR-629,
(S. D. Tex.
2011)[hereinafter O'Shea Defendant's Motion].
22 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 6; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 5.
23 O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supra note 21.
24 Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12.
25

Id.

26

United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1113 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Govenment's Opposition to Defendants' Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the

27

Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 16, United States v. Carson, No. SA CR 09-00077JVS, (C. D. Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Government's Carson Opposition Brief]; Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding Indictment; Memorandum of Points and Authorities; Exhibits at 11,
United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (No. 10-CR-1031) [hereinafter Government's
Lindsey Opposition Brief]; Response of the United States to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictment at 4-5,
United States v. O'Shea, No. H-09-CR-629 (S. D. Tex. 2011) [hereinafter Government's O'Shea Opposition
Brief].

CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S.Ct. 665, 675 (2012) ("[P]roof of Congress' intent may also be
discovered in the history or purpose of the statute in question.")(Sotomayor, J., concurring)(citation omitted);
28

King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 221 (1991) ("[A] statute is to be read as a whole since the meaning
of statutory language, plain or not, depends on context.")(citations omitted).
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Initially, FCPA defendants used Congressional purpose minimally. The Nguyen and
Esquenazi defendants asserted that the purpose of the FCPA was to criminalize improper
payments to officials performing a public function. 29 The defendants applied canons of
construction to show Congress' intent involved government function, not control.30
The Lindsey and Carson defendants expanded usage of arguments involving
structure and purpose. Three aspects of the FCPA are shown to support the idea that the
FCPA's target was the bribery of foreign public officials. First, the FCPA's "foreign official"
definition suggests concern with public officials because employees of "public international
organizations," politicians, and candidates are explicitly included.31 Second, the FCPA's
routine governmental action exception only applies to governmental action.32 Third, the
FCPA's affirmative defense for bona fide expenditures related to contracts with a foreign
government or agency does not mention instrumentalities. 33 This suggests Congress believed
the terms "agency" and "instrumentality" covered comparable subject matter.34
The most powerful response the government makes related to the FCPA's structure
and purpose involves the routine governmental action exception. Essentially, the surplusage
canon shows that the exception requires "instrumentality" to include SOEs. 35 Since SOEs
undertake many of the enumerated governmental actions listed in the exception, it would be
illogical for SOEs to be excluded from the FCPA's grasp.
iii. Noscitura soclis, Ejusdem generis, and the Canon Against Surplusage
Courts may also consult the canons of statutory interpretation in resolving
ambiguities in the definition of "foreign official. 36 The noscitur a sociis canon, the ejusdem
generis canon, and the canon against surplusage have all been noticeable features of these
challenges.37 Those canons are particularly relevant because "instrumentality" exists within a
list that includes the terms "department" and "agency."
FCPA defendants have applied the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons. 8
Applying the noscitur a sociis canon, "words grouped in a list should be given related

29 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 7; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 6.
30 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 2; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion,

supra note 21, at 2.

3' Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 16-17; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 9.
32Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 17; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 10.
31 Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 18.
34 Id.

3' Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 20-23; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief
supra note 27, at 12-14; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27.
36See, e.g., Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 313 (1938) ("Resort is had to canons of constructions as an aid in
ascertaining the intent of the Legislature.").
17Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 14-15; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 13;
Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12-15; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 8-9;
O 'Shea Defendant's Motion, supra note 21, at 3-4; Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at
20-23; Goverment's Lindsey Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at 12-14; Government's O'Shea Opposition
Brief, supra note 26.
38 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 14-15; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 13;
Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12-15; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 8-9;
O 'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 3-4.
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meaning. 39 With the ejusdem generis canon, general words following specific words in a list
are construed to be similar in nature to the specific words.40 As the Lindsey defendants noted,
"department" and "agency" limit the scope of "instrumentality" to entities only existing in
government, at the government's pleasure, funded by government, oriented to policies and/or
public policy with defined powers uniform within each state. 41 Most likely, the term
"instrumentality" would apply to entities such as government branches, ministries, bureaus,
boards, administrations, commissions, and militaries, among others.42 SOEs, however, are
created for countless reasons and share no necessarily identifiable characteristics between
departments and agencies.
Thus, SOEs must be excluded from the meaning of
"instrumentality."
FCPA defendants do not uniformly apply both canons. The Nguyen, Esquenazi and
Lindsey defendants applied the ejusdem generis canon. 4 The Carson and O'Shea defendants
only claim to apply the nosictur a sociis canon. This marks a departure from prior cases,
showing a lack of consensus on applying the ejusdem generis canon.
In response to the FCPA defendants' use of the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis canons, the government applies the canon against surplusage. 45 This principle states
that courts should interpret all of a statute's portions to have independent meaning.46 The DOJ
has argued that parts of the "routine governmental action" exception are rendered
meaningless if SOEs are not "instrumentalities." This exception exempts payments made to
"foreign officials" to facilitate the performance of "routine governmental action" from the
FCPA's purview. "Routine governmental action" is further defined as applying to such
activity as mail pick-up, providing phone service, power, and water supply. 47 Since foreign
SOEs can and do provide these services, "instrumentality" must include SOEs for the "routine
governmental action" exception to have full meaning.
The limited responses from the FCPA's defendants about the canon against
surplusage use in the context of the "routine governmental action" exception have varied.48

'9 Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 36 (1990) (quoting Massachusetts v. Morash, 490
U.S. 107, 114-115 (1989)).
40 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15 (2001).
41 Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 8.
42 Id.
4' Reply to Government's Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the First Superseding Indictment at 4,
United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (No. CR 10-CR-1031(A)-AHM) [hereinafter
Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief].
44 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 14-15; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 13;
Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 8-9.
45 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 20-23; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supranote 27, at 12-14; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27.
46 See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979) ("In construing a statute we are obliged to give
effect, if possible, to every word Congress used." (citing United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-539
(1955))).
47 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(4)(A).
48Defendant's Reply in Support of Amended Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Ten of the Indictment at
12-13, United States v. Carson (C. D. Cal. 2011) (No. 09-CR-077-JVS)[hereinafter CarsonDefendants' Reply
Brief]; Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 43, at 5-6; Defendant O'Shea's Reply to the Response of
the United States to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts One Through Seventeen of the Indictment at 8-9,
United States v. O'Shea (S. D. Tex.)(No. 09-CR-629)[hereinafter O'Shea Defendant's Reply Brief];
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The Lindsey and O'Shea defendants emphasized that a "foreign official" is determined by the
nature of the entity, not the nature of the service, in question. 49 The Carson defendants
asserted that Congress was concerned only with corruption payments to governmental
officials.5 °
iv. The Absurdity Doctrine
Another consideration for courts is the applicability of the absurdity doctrine. Under
this venerable maxim, courts should not construe statutes in manners that create absurd
results.51 All the FCPA defendants have argued that if the meaning "instrumentality" includes
SOEs it would lead to absurd results.52 The most common example of absurdity cited is the
extent of people that would qualify as a "foreign official." Essentially, under the
government's interpretation of the term, American employees of a foreign SOE, living and
working within the U.S., would be considered "foreign officials," regardless of the
circumstances surrounding the SOE's existence.53
In articulating this argument, the Nguyen defendants stated, and the Esquenazi
defendants repeated, that "mere control of an entity by a foreign government no more makes
that entity's employees 'foreign officials' than control of General Motors by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury makes all GM employees U.S. officials.", 54 The Lindsey
defendants saw absurdity in American citizens working within the U.S. ever being considered
"foreign officials." 55 Additional considerations such as the suddenness, temporariness, or
crisis surrounding a foreign state's nationalization of a private company would be irrelevant
under the government's analysis. 56 The government's argument implicates that a private
company's reliance on a foreign state alone renders its employees "foreign officials" under
the FCPA.

Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 16; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief, supra
note 27, at 11; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27.
49 Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 43, at 6; O'Shea Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 8.
50 Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 13.
51 See Pub. Citizen v. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454 (1989) ("When the literal reading of a statutory term
would compel 'an odd result,' this Court searches beyond the bare text for other evidence of congressional
intent."); see also United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. 482, 483 (1868)("All laws should receive a sensible
construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an
absurd consequence, and it will always be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language
which would avoid results of this character.").
52 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 9; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 7;
Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 19-21; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12-13;
O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 6-7.
53Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 2; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 2;
Carson Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 19-21; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 13.
14 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 2; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra
note 21, at 2.
" Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 13.
56 Id.
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Courts are reluctant, however, to decide issues of law based on hypothetical
examples. 57 A hypothetical example, by its very nature, is a theoretical situation. It is not the
actual situation before the court. Also, given the limitations of language it would be a rare
occurrence that a hypothetical absurdity does not exist in a statute. This reluctance to
construe statutes based upon hypothetical absurdity serves as the government's counter to the
absurdity doctrine's applicability.59

v. Congress Knows How to State...
Another relevant canon of statutory construction in determining whether the term
"instrumentality" includes SOEs, lies in the adage that "Congress knows how to say" when a
particular word is to be given a broad or narrow meaning. 60 Although FCPA defendants have
disagreed in formulation, this
requires comparing the FCPA with other federal statutes using
61
the term "instrumentality.

Examining other statutes, Congress has defined "instrumentality" to explicitly
include SOEs. Two prime examples exist for this broad definition of "instrumentality" in the
62
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") and the Economic Espionage Act ("EEA").
The FSIA defines "instrumentality" to include "any entity.. .which is an organ of a foreign
state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof., 63 In the EEA, the term "foreign
instrumentality" explicitly includes business organizations, corporations, firms and other
entities "substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, managed, or dominated by
a foreign government." 64 These examples tend to show that "instrumentality" has a narrower
meaning that only includes SOEs when Congress explicitly defines "instrumentality" to
include them.
Also showing Congressional understanding of the term's narrowness is when
statutes use additional language to include SOEs. One significant example is in §1504 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank"). Dodd-Frank
states that the term "foreign government" means a "foreign government, a department,

See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584 (1998) ("[W]e are reluctant.. .to invalidate
legislation on the basis of [the absurdity doctrine's] hypothetical application to situations not before the Court."
(quoting FCCv. PacificaFound, 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978))).
58 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (noting the limitations of language may cause
hypothetical absurdity).
'9 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 39-42; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief
supra note 27, at 25-26; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 13.
60 See YULE KIM, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., STATUARY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES
AND RECENT TRENDS 19 (2008) (detailing the nature and use of the "Congress knows how to say" canon of
construction).
61 The Nguyen and Esquenazi defendants purport to apply the in pari materia canon, but examine non-bribery
related statutes in a manner similar to the other FCPA defendants. The Lindsey defendants state Congress was
aware it could include SOEs within the meaning of "instrumentality," but chose not to do so. Only the Carson
and O'Shea defendants use this explicit terminology. Despite differing verbiage, the arguments are analogous.
62 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (b) (2006); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §
1839 (1) (2006).
6'3 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (b) (2006).
64 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1839 (1) (2006).
17
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agency, or instrumentality of a foreign government, or a company owned by a foreign
government., 65 If "instrumentality" already included SOEs, it would render meaningless the
language about "a company owned by a foreign government." The SEC reinforced this
demarcation with §1504's final rules, which clarified a "company owned by a foreign
government" was a "company... majority-owned by a foreign government. 66 With this rule,
if Congress used "instrumentality" to included SOEs it would render the clarification entirely
unnecessary.
Initial usage of this argument was made by the Nguyen defendants. The Nguyen
defendants analyzed two statutes, the FSIA and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act ("ERISA"). The Nguyen defendants' showed that courts and the Internal Revenue Service
have construed "instrumentality" within ERISA as involving entities performing
governmental functions, not private interests. 67 Other than the Esquenazi defendants'
parroting of the Nguyen defendants arguments, FSIA and ERISA have not been used equally
by later defendants. Defendants in every "foreign official" challenge have used FSIA.68
ERISA has not been used outside the Nguyen and Esquenazi motions. The reason for this may
lay in the particular emphasis on government control versus government function highlighted
by the Nguyen defendants.
Interestingly, the Nguyen defendants claim to apply the in pari materia canon in this
analysis of the FSIA and ERISA. Under the in pari materia canon, courts should construe the
same term in similar statutes to have equivalent meaning.69 The in pari materia canon is only
applicable when statutes share the same subject.70 The statutes analyzed by the Nguyen
defendants are plainly not anti-bribery statutes. While this may appear inconsequential, the
government nonetheless continuously recycles the in pari materia canon in its arguments. "
Since the in pari materia canon is highly flawed in the FCPA's context due to the lack of
comparable anti-bribery statutes, both FCPA defendants and the government should avoid its
erroneous application.
Compared to the original examination of federal statutes in Nguyen and Esquenazi,
more recent FCPA defendants have analyzed the EEA and Dodd-Frank. Despite this
65

Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1504, 124

Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.).
Payments By Resource Extraction Issuers, 77 Fed. Reg. 56365, 56368 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 240,249).
67 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 9.
68 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 9; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 8;
66

Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 30-31; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12;
O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 4.
69 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) (plurality opinion) ("[W]hen Congress uses the same
language in two statutes having similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is
appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes." (quoting
Northcross v. Bd of Ed. of Memphis City Schools, 412 U.S. 427, 428 (1973) (per curium))).
70 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely
to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute
(or statutes on the same subject) and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions,
and give to it such a construction as will carry into execution the will of the Legislature..." (quoting Brown v.
Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857))) (emphasis added).
71 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 24-26; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 21-23; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 10-12. The government also
habitually points out that more explicit definitions place greater limits on terms, rather than less.
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similarity, the defendants diverged in their usage of Dodd-Frank. The Carson and O'Shea
defendants analyze Dodd-Frank like the FSIA or EEA.72 The Lindsey defendants used DoddFrank in a footnote as an example of the use of the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis
canons of construction to limit the meaning of the term "instrumentality. 73 As these cases
predate the promulgation of §1504's final rules, FCPA defendants' arguments have not
addressed them thus far.
vi. The Rule of Lenity and Unconstitutional Vagueness
The rule of lenity holds that if ambiguity exists despite application of the tools of
statutory interpretation, the court must resolve the uncertainty in the defendant's favor. 74 A
statute is unconstitutionally vague if its language does not give fair warning about the
prohibited conduct.75 If a court examining "foreign official" exhausts the tools of statutory
construction and ambiguity remains, then it should grant the FCPA defendants' motion.76
The rule of lenity and unconstitutional vagueness arguments are typically the final
arguments offered by FCPA defendants. The essence of these arguments is that the FCPA, as
it applies to SOEs, remains ambiguous despite the government's interpretation. 77 At the very
minimum, this ambiguity requires a decision in the defendants' favor. Alternatively, an
ordinary person could not determine whether their conduct was criminalized under the
FCPA. 7 8 These arguments repeat the defendants' theme of portraying the statute's ambiguity
as rendering it inapplicable.
The government weakens both these arguments by emphasizing the high threshold
necessary for their application. 79 The rule of lenity requires severe uncertainty as to Congress'
intent with the language of the statute.8 0 Also, statutes declared unconstitutionally vague by
72Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 32; O'SheaDefendant's Reply Brief, supranote 49, at 7.
7'Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 9 n. 8.
74See United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 54 (1994) ("In these circumstances-where text, structure,
and history fail to establish that the Government's position is unambiguously correct-we apply the rule of
lenity and resolve the ambiguity in [the defendant's] favor.").
75See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) ("Although it is not likely that a criminal will
carefully consider the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable that a fair warning should be
given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do ifa certain
line is passed.").
76Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 15-17; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 1415; Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 35-39; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 21;
O 'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 7.
77Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 35-39; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 21;
O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 7.
78 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 17-18; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 1617; Carson Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 39-48; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 23-24;
O 'Shea Defendant's Motion, supranote 21, at 6-7.
79 Government's Response in Opposition to Defendant Esquenazi's Corrected and Amended Motion to
Dismiss Indictment for Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness at 9, 10 n 5, United States v.
Esquenazi, No. 09-CR-21010-JEM, (S .D. Fl. 2010) [hereinafter Government's Esquenazi Opposition Brief];
Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at 42, 45; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supranote 26, at 35, 38-39.
'0Barber v. Thomas, 130 S.Ct. 2499, 2508-9 (2010) ("[T]he rule of lenity only applies if, after considering
text, structure, history, and purpose, there remains a 'grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute,' such that
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facial challenges typically implicate the First Amendment. 8 1 Other statutes are typically
viewed under an "as-applied challenge., 8 2 As-applied challenges fail when the statute is
reasonably clear and the defendant's conduct was criminal, which necessitates a factual based
inquiry. 83 Thus, if whether an SOE is an "instrumentality" is a question of fact, the
defendants' motions would fail.
vii. Legislative History
Courts generally use legislative history to resolve ambiguities when other tools of
statutory construction prove unavailing. 4 Usage of legislative history, however, is not without
controversy. 85 The Supreme Court has stated Congress' "authoritative statement is the
statutory text, not the legislative history. ' 86 The government has criticized FCPA defendants'
emphasis on the legislative history instead of the actual text of the statute. 7 Nevertheless, the
FCPA's legislative history is relevant to defendants for three general reasons.
First, Congress rejected proposed bills explicitly addressing SOEs before and during
the FCPA's enactment. In the year before the FCPA's enactment, legislators in both the
House and Senate considered anti-bribery bills that included foreign state owned
corporations. 8 A year later, the House considered an analogous bill that would have plainly
applied to SOEs. 9 During the FCPA's enactment, the Senate bill vaguely defined foreign
officials. 90 The House's more precise definition of "foreign official" became the definition
enacted. 91 Unlike its predecessors, H.R. 3815 did not explicitly include SOEs in its definition

the Court must simply 'guess as to what Congress intended.'" (quoting Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S.
125, 139 (1998))).
81 United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975) ("It is well established that vagueness challenges to
statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case
at hand." (quoting United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963))).
82 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259,267 (1997).
83 Id. ("[T]he touchstone [before criminal liability may be imposed] is whether the statute, either standing alone
or as construed by the courts, made it reasonably clear at the time of the charged conduct that the conduct was
criminal.").
84 Children's Hosp. and Health Center v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096 (1999) ("If ambiguity exists, we may
use legislative history as an aid to interpretation.").
85 See Alex Kozinski, Should Reading Legislative History be an Impeachable Offense?, 31 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 807 (1998) (noting the general arguments made in support of and against the use of legislative history in
statutory construction).
86 Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S.Ct. 1968, 1980 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)).
87 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 14; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 10.
88 See Declaration of Professor Michael J. Koehler in Support of Defendants' Motion To Dismiss Counts One
Through Ten of the Indictment at 16 (d), United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701
(C.D. Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Koehler Declaration] (observing the proposed definitions for "foreign official" in
S. 3741, H.R. 15149, and H.R. 7543 would have explicitly included SOEs).
89 Id.

90 S. 305, 95th Cong. (1977).

" H.R. 3815, 95th Cong. § 30A(e)(2) (1977).
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of "foreign official. 9 2 This suggests Congressional awareness that SOEs could be part of the
definition of "foreign official," but ultimately the bargained definition did not include them.
Second, Congress focused on routine governmental action during the 1988
amendment process. In 1988, Congress altered the language of the term "foreign official." 93
Congress removed the exclusion of employees doing ministerial or clerical work from the
definition of "foreign official," and carved out a separate "routine governmental action"
exception.94 Congress' concern for governmental action indicates a narrower focus on bribery
involving traditional government functions.
Third, the FCPA's 1998 amendments to implement the OECD Convention show
that Congress chose to narrowly alter "foreign official" despite the Convention's broader
equivalent. The OECD Convention definition of "foreign public officials" explicitly
mentions "public enterprises. "' The 1998 amendments altered "foreign official" to include
96
officials at "public international organizations," but not "public enterprises.
This exclusion
97
FCPA.
the
in
SOEs
include
evidences Congressional unwillingness to
Initial use of legislative history by FCPA defendants was rather subdued. The
Nguyen defendants did not analyze the FCPA's legislative history beyond a committee report
statement that Congress intended the 1998 FCPA amendments to implement the OECD
Convention, and citing what became the implementing legislation itself.98 The Esquenazi
defendants then redrafted the Nguyen defendants' cursory legislative history analysis. 99
Despite perfunctory treatment in early "foreign official" challenges, legislative
history has become the cornerstone of FCPA defendants' arguments. Comprehensive analysis
of the FCPA legislative history began in Carson with the Declaration of Professor Michael J.
Koehler ("Koehler Declaration" or "the Declaration"). The 143 page Koehler Declaration
extensively analyzes the FCPA's legislative history. The Declaration examines FCPA
predecessors, the FCPA's enactment and amendments, and recent legislative developments. 100
Demonstrating its significance, both the Lindsey and O'Shea defendants have cited to the
Koehler Declaration. 101 On appeal, the Esquenazi defendants also cited the Koehler
02
Declaration.

92

Id.

9'Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003, 102 Stat. 1415 (1988)
(amended 1998).
94See Koehler Declaration, supra note 87, at
281-383 (discussing the legislative history relevant to the
creation of the express "routine governmental action" exception).
9'Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, arts. 1, 4(a), Dec. 17, 1997.
96 The International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, sec. 2 §§a(l)(A),
a(2)(A), 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
97Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 28-29; Lindsey Defendant's Motion, supra note 21, at 20.
98 Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 14.
99Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 12-13.

10' See Koehler Declaration, supranote 88, at 19.
101Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 15-17; O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supra note 21, at 5.
102

Corrected Initial Brief of Appellant at 37-39, United States v. Rodriguez (1 1th Cir. 2012) (No. 11 15331-C)

[hereinafter Rodriguez Appeal]; Brief of Appellant at 36-37, United States v. Esquenazi (11th Cir. 2012) (No.
11-1533 1-C) [hereinafter Esquenazi Appeal].
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Nevertheless, differences do exist. The degree of arguments made about the FCPA's
legislative history is a distinguishable feature between the Aguilar and Carson motions.103 By
comparison, the Lindsey defendants provided a truncated legislative history in a different
structural form than the Carson defendants. Despite stylistic differences, some key
distinctions exist among the motions. First, the Carson defendants admit "there is nothing in
the FCPA's legislative history addressing the 'any department, agency, or instrumentality'
portion of the 'foreign official' definition." 104 Second, the Carson defendants analyze
Congressional purpose along with legislative history whereas the Lindsey defendants apply
Congressional purpose in asserting the plain meaning of "foreign official." 105 Third, the
Carson defendants note Congress used the terms "foreign government official," "foreign
public official," and "foreign official" interchangeably. 106
FCPA defendants' use of legislative history is not flawless, and the government's
response highlights its deficiencies. The government finds it compelling that Congress chose
a broad word like "instrumentality" in the definition of "foreign official" rather than specific
enumerated lists found in prior bills. 107
In making this point in Carson,Aguilar, and O'Shea, the government has relied on a
lone Seventh Circuit opinion.108 In National-StandardCo. v. Adamkus, the court found it
significant that Congress "chose [a] broad, general term" over an enumerated list. 10 9 This
broadness was demonstrated in the legislative history. Citing a specific and remarkably
unambiguous reference in the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984's ("HSWA")
legislative history, the court justified the conclusion that Congress intended "hazardous
waste" to apply to all waste meeting the statutory definition of "hazardous waste."1'

10

Continued reliance on Adamkus may be undeserved. In Adamkus, a congressional
report explicitly referred to Congressional intent for a broad term. The FCPA's legislative
history does not show unequivocal support for a broad definition of "foreign official" in any
report.111 Nothing in the FCPA's initial legislative history, or the prior anti-bribery bills, nears
unequivocal support for a broad reading of "foreign official" akin to the HSWA report.
Despite this, no FCPA defendant has concerned itself with the government's citation of
Adamkus.

The government has made other arguments involving the FCPA's legislative
history. With the "routine governmental action" exception, the government has asserted that
the exception necessarily requires the FCPA to apply to SOEs. They argue that certain
"routine governmental action," such as electricity and telecommunications, are administered
0

1 3 CompareCarson Defendants'

Motion, supra note 20, at 22, 25-26, with Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra

note 21, at 10-12. The O'Shea defendant's legislative history analysis relies heavily on the Carson defendants'
reasoning.
104 Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 20, at 22.
'05 Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 20, at 25; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 10-12.
10, Carson Defendants' Motion, supranote 20, at 26.
107 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 36-38; Government's Lindsey Opposition Briet
supra note 27, at 32-34; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 17.
108Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 37; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 32-33; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 17.
109National-Standard Co. v. Adamkus, 881 F.2d 352, 360 (1989).
110Id.
1

Koehler Declaration, supranote 88.
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and controlled by foreign SOEs.1 12 The government's arguments about the 1998 amendments
tend to tie into arguments made about the Charming Betsy doctrines application. The
argument is that Congress did not need to include "public enterprises" in the definition of
"foreign official." "Instrumentality" was broad enough to bring the U.S. into full compliance
with the OECD Convention once "public international organizations" was added to the
definition. 113 These arguments attempt to show that the legislative history is clear, or at least
unambiguous, as to whether "instrumentality" includes SOEs.
A recent development to the government's legislative history argument has been to
directly attack the Koehler Declaration. In the Esquenazi appeal, the DOJ urged the appellate
court to not even consider the Koehler Declaration. u 4 In an effort to discredit the Declaration,
the government claimed it was a selective analysis of the legislative history, was not reviewed
'
as a scholarly article, and that Koehler was not a "disinterested expert."115
It remains to be
seen whether this attack on the Koehler Declaration's veracity will become part of the
government's future general arguments.
B. The Government's Arguments and Defendants' Responses
i. A Premature Motion to Dismiss
In every "foreign official" challenge, the government has argued that the defendants
are prematurely requesting a ruling on the sufficiency of the government's evidence. 1 6 The
government asserts that the indictment states that the crime charged is in accordance with
Rule 7(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 11 7 This rule requires indictments
contain "a plain, ' concise
and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the
18
offense charged."
The Supreme Court established a two-prong test in Hagner v. United States to
determine an indictment's sufficiency under Rule 7(c)(1). The Hagner test requires that an
indictment (1) states the elements of the crime charged and (2) "sufficiently apprise[s] the
defendant of what he must be prepared to meet." 11 9 Applying Hagner, the government insists
112See Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 21-23; Government's Lindsey Opposition

Brief, supra note 27, at 14; Government's O'SheaOpposition Brief, supra note 27, at 6-7.
13 See Government's Carson Opposition, supra note 27, at 30; Government's Lindsey Opposition, supra note
27, at 21; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 9.
114 Brief for the United States at 42 n. 13, United States v. Esquenazi (1lth Cir. 2012) (No. 11-1533 l-C).
115 Id.
116 See Government's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Second Motion to at 2, United States v. Nguyen,
No. 08-CR-522-TJS, (E. D. Pa. 2009) [hereinafter Government's Nguyen Opposition Brief]; Government's
Esquenazi Opposition Brief, supra note 80, at 1; Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 4-9;
Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 7-15; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra
note 27, at 2-4.
117 See Government's Nguyen Opposition Brief, supra note 116, at 5; Government's Esquenazi Opposition
Brief, supra note 80, at 6; Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 9; Government's Lindsey
Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 8; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 2.
118

FED R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).

Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431 (1932) ("The true test of the sufficiency of an indictment is not
whether it could have been made more definite and certain, but whether it contains the elements of the offense
intended to be charged, and sufficiently apprises the defendant of what he must be prepared to meet, and, in
119
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the indictment sufficiently states the elements of the offense and allows the defendant a basis
to claim double jeopardy. 120 By the government's reasoning, the motion to dismiss is
premature because SOE employees are properly alleged "foreign officials" in the
indictment. 121 If true, the indictment's factual burden is met. Whether an SOE is an
"instrumentality" would be a question of fact, not law, to be decided through trial evidence.
Only the Lindsey and Carson defendants have explicitly challenged the
government's prematurity argument. 122 The Lindsey defendants insisted their motion raised12a
purely legal argument that a FCPA indictment is inappropriate for cases involving SOEs. 1
The Carson defendants responded that Hagner was unavailing. 124 The Hagner test cannot
prevent an indictment's pretrial dismissal if the charge does not state a federal offense. 125 If
the FCPA does not restrict bribery of SOE employees,
as the defendants assert, then the
126
government's indictment would fail to state an offense.
ii.

Interpreting the "Any" Modifier

The use of the modifier "any" may also illuminate the meaning of "foreign official."
By its very nature, the term "any" suggests broadness. 127 In the FCPA, three important
observations can be made about the "any" modifier. First, the "foreign official" definition
uses the phrase "any department, agency, or instrumentality., 128 Second, the "foreign official"
definition uses the "any" modifier five times. 129 Third, the FCPA as a whole uses the "any"
modifier a total of twenty-seven times. 130 The government has repeatedly used these
observations about the "any" modifier's ample
use to support the notion that Congress
13 1
intended for a broad construction of the FCPA.
Nonetheless, the "any" modifier does not exist in a vacuum. The extent of the "any"
modifier can only be known in relation to the term it modifies. It is imprudent to give

case any other proceedings are taken against him for similar offenses, whether the record shows with accuracy
to what extent he may plead a former acquittal or conviction.").
120 See Government's Nguyen Opposition Brief, supra note 116, at 5; Government's Esquenazi Opposition
Brief, supranote 80, at 7; Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 11; Government's Lindsey
Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 8; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 2.
121 Government's Nguyen Opposition Brief, supra note 115, at 5; Government's Esquenazi Opposition Brief,
supra note 79, at 7; Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 11; Government's Lindsey
Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 8; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 2.
122 See Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 2-4; Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note
43, at 1-2.
123 Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 43, at 2.
124 Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 2-4.
126

Id. at 4.
Id.

127

See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1996) ("Read naturally, the word 'any' has an expansive

125

meaning, that is, 'one or some indiscriminately of what-ever kind. ") (quoting Webster's Third New
International Dictionary, 97 (1976)).
128 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006).
129 id.
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1-3.
...Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 19-20; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief
supra note 27, at 19-21; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 10.
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credence to the modifier without knowing the limitations of the attached term. This linguistic
argument is the FCPA defendants' general response to the government's use of the "any"
modifier argument. 13 2 This approach is based less on the law and more on the common usage
of the term.
iii. The Charming Betsy Doctrine
The Charming Betsy doctrine states "an Act of Congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains."133 In the
context of the FCPA, the government argues that courts should interpret the statute to
comport with the OECD Convention. 134 Signed by the U.S. in 1997 as an international effort
to combat bribery, Congress amended the FCPA in 1998 to implement the OECD Convention
' 135
by adding "public international organizations" to the definition of "foreign official."
Examining the OECD Convention's definition of "foreign public official," the government
136
asserts that the term was meant to apply to SOEs.
The Charming Betsy doctrine is only applicable, however, if the potentially
harmonious construction violates neither the statute nor the treaty. 137 This concept comes
from the case Whitney v. Robertson, and its progeny, as the counter-canon to the Charming
Betsy doctrine. 138 In essence, treaties and statutes are on equal footing.139 A conflict between a
treaty and a statute is resolved in favor of Congress' last enactment. 140 This is relevant to the
OECD Convention as the treaty was non-self executing, requiring Congressional enactment.
Therefore, the FCPA's 1998 amendments supersede the OECD Convention. FCPA
defendants have argued Congress did not entirely implement the OECD Convention
with the
141
FCPA's 1998 amendments, thus making the CharmingBetsy doctrine inapplicable.
This general argument by FCPA defendants has stayed remarkably consistent
through the cases. Both the Nguyen and Esquenazi defendants raised the issue that Congress
did not implement the OECD Convention with the 1998 amendments to the FCPA in their

132 Carson Defendants'

Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 12; Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 43, at
5; O'Shea Defendant's Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 11.
133Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118-19 (1804).
134 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 30; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 15; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 8.
135 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 30; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 16; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 8.
136

Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 28-33; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,

supra note 27, at 14-19; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 7-9.
137 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining by the Constitution of the United States, a

treaty and a statute are placed on the same footing, and if the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will
control, provided the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing).
13 See Michael Franck, Note, The Future of JudicialInternationalism:Charming Betsy, Medellin v. Dretke,

and the Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U.L. REv. 515, 531-532, 540-545 (2006) (describing Whitney and its

progeny as the antithesis of the Charming Betsy doctrine and supporting the Charming Betsy doctrine over the
Whitney standard).
139 Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194.
140 id
141

Carson Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 15; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 9; O'Shea

Defendant's Motion, supra note 21, at 9.
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Motions to Dismiss. 142 The Lindsey, Carson, and O'Shea defendants continued this argument
in their reply briefs. 143 The more recent FCPA defendants have articulated this general
argument far beyond the initial remarks made by the Nguyen and Esquenazi defendants. For
example, these newer defendants have analyzed the OECD Convention's commentary and
noted that other signatories have not applied their resulting anti-bribery statutes to SOEs. 144
Overall, the FCPA defendants' argument challenges the government's reliance on
Congressional silence in a plausible and sensible way. This could be the reason for the
defendants' consistency on this point.
iv. Persuasive Precedent
The fact that no court has granted any FCPA defendant's motion on this issue
supports the interpretation that "foreign official" includes employees of SOEs. In Esquenazi,
the government referred to the denied motion in Nguyen. 145 Similarly, in Carson,Aguilar,
and
146
O'Shea the government mentioned prior denials of similar "foreign official" challenges.
Additionally, courts have accepted more than thirty five guilty pleas in FCPA
prosecutions involving SOEs.1 47 This is significant, as Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires district courts to have a factual basis that the crime was
committed before accepting a guilty plea. 141 If the FCPA did not apply to the bribery of
employees of SOEs, the government suggests that acceptance of these guilty pleas would be
in error.
FCPA defendants have sought to distinguish their cases from prior cases, especially
NAguyen and Esquenazi. The O'Shea defendant noted that these prior cases gave little or no
substantive analysis of the FCPA, and did not examine the legislative history. 149 Both the
Lindsey and Carson defendants distinguish Nguyen and Esquenazi on the grounds that they
raise a factual issue about the term "foreign official." 150 In Nguyen and Esquenazi, the
defendants argued that the term "instrumentality" only applied to business entities performing
government functions. The courts dismissed the defendants' arguments as factually based and
premature.151 Distinguishing their case from Nguyen and Esquenazi, the Lindsey defendants

142

Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 13-14; Esquenazi Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 12-

13.
Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 14-17; Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 43,
at 7-12; O'SheaDefendant's Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 9-11.
144 Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 16; Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supra note 43, at
10-12; O'Shea Defendant's Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 10.
145 Government's Esquenazi Opposition Brief, supra note 79, at 9 n. 2.
146Govenment's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 17-19; Government's Lindsey Opposition Briet
supra note 27, at 27; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 14.
147 Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 18-19; Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief,
supra note 27, at 27-28; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 14.
148 FEDR. CRM. P. 11(b)(3).
149 O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supra note 21, at 2-3.
150 Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 3-4 n. 4; Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 11.
15' Government's Lindsey Opposition Brief, supra note 27, at 3-4 n. 5.
'43
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argued that their dismissal motion152was based on the notion that the term "instrumentality"
excludes SOEs as a matter of law.
Although both the Carson and the Lindsey defendants distinguish Nguyen and
Esquenazi as representing a premature factually based issue, the Carson argument is more
detailed, but less explicit. 153 Whereas the Lindsey defendants initially distinguish Nguyen and
Esquenazi in a footnote and reiterate the distinction in their reply brief, the Carson defendants
discuss the cases at length in their initial brief. The Carson defendants point out the
similarities between the briefs in those cases, as well as the serial filing of motions in
Esquenazi, which may have "colored the court's view." 15 4 Instead of emphasizing the flaws of
the arguments, the Lindsey defendants pointed out the distinctiveness of their own argument.
The Lindsey defendants articulated their arguments, unlike the arguments made about
"instrumentality" in Nguyen and Esquenazi, as not factual in nature, and not based on the
concept of governmental control. Despite a considerable discussion, the importance of this
point is lost in the more detailed Carson motion and is shown
in the Carson court's decision,
155
which appears to assume both prior cases were on point.
Later FCPA defendants have also distinguished the Aguilar case. The Carson
defendants perceive the Aguilar decision as distinguishable because the entity involved was
considered a "public entity" and not an SOE. 156 The O'Shea defendant identified the Aguilar
decision as different because that court believed a factual157dispute existed as to whether the
SOE in question was performing a "government function.9
As for guilty pleas in FCPA prosecutions involving SOEs, FCPA defendants note
that pleas are insignificant in determining the limits of what constitutes a "foreign official." 15
The FCPA defendants tend to offer general observations about plea agreements and Rule 11.
The O'Shea defendant noted that plea agreements do not convert the government's
interpretation into the law. 159 Similarly, the Carson defendants state that a court's acceptance
of a guilty plea does not require statutory interpretation. 160 The Lindsey defendants go beyond
these general observations and into Rule I1's legislative history. 161 They note that, during the
drafting of the 1966 amendments to Rule 11, Congress clearly rejected a requirement
that
1 62
courts evaluate the prosecution's legal conclusions before accepting a guilty plea.

Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 3.
Carson Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 11; Lindsey Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 3.
154 Carson Defendants' Motion, supra note 21, at 11.
155 See United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, *8-9 (C. D. Cal. 2011).
156 CarsonDefendants' Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 11.
157O'Shea Defendant's Reply Brief, supra note 48, at 3.
158 Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 43, at 18; Carson Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 48, at
152
153

11; O'Shea Defendant's Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 1.
Id. at 1-2.
"" CarsonDefendants' Reply Brief, supranote 48, at 11.
161 Lindsey Defendants' Reply Brief, supranote 43, at 18.
162 id.
159
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IV. Specific Cases, Decisions, and Comparisons
A. Nguyen
In their motion to dismiss, the Nguyen defendants focused on the particular language
of the indictment's allegation that the targeted employees' companies were "controlled" by a
government agency, department, or instrumentality. 163 The defendants argued that
government function, not control, was the defining characteristic of the term
"instrumentality." 164 Applying this interpretation of "instrumentality," the bribes' targets
would not be considered "foreign officials" as government
control of an SOE was not
165
tantamount to the performance of government function.
In supporting this interpretation of "instrumentality," the Nguyen defendants gave
cursory treatment to many of the FCPA defendants' general legal arguments. For example,
the motion briefly mentions the applicability of the ejusdem generis canon of statutory
construction. 166 In approximately half a page, the defendants argue an "instrumentality" must
perform a governmental function akin to functions performed by governmental agencies and
departments. 167 No further elaboration was provided beyond that statement.
The Nguyen Court passed ruling on the substantive claims made by the defendants.
The motion was denied without opinion shortly after the Court received the government's
response. 168 The Court appeared persuaded by the government's argument that the motion
was really "a premature request for a ruling on the sufficiency of the government's evidence
before any of that evidence has been presented., 169 Thus, the Court avoided a substantive
determination on the "foreign official" element and allowed the government to present its
case. 170
B. Esquenazi
In the year following Nguyen, the Esquenazi defendants challenged the notion that
SOE employees were "foreign officials" under the FCPA. The Esquenazi defendants'
arguments parallel, and do not elaborate upon, the arguments offered in Nguyen. Aside from
the facts, the precise wording of the Esquenazi motion appears virtually identical to the
Nguyen motion. Even the cases cited are the same, despite different applicable Circuit Court
precedent. The government highlighted the striking similarities between the Nguyen and
171
Esquenazi motions in its response.

163Nguyen Defendants' Motion, supranote 21, at 1.
164 Id.at6.
165 id.

166Id.at 9-10.
167

Id. at 14-15.

168Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Nguyen, No. 08-CR-522-TJS, (E. D. Pa. 2009).
169Government's Nguyen Opposition Brief, supra note 117, at 1.
170 id.
171 Government's Esquenazi Opposition Brief, supra note 80, at 9 n. 2.
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Despite the similarities to the arguments made in Nguyen, the Esquenazi Court
actually issued a perfunctory three-page written opinion. 172 Without addressing the
defendants' substantive arguments, the Court held that the indictment allegations were
sufficient to withstand the Motion to Dismiss.173 The Court did, however, disagree that the
definition of "foreign official" was unconstitutionally vague because "persons of common
intelligence would have a fair notice of this statute's prohibitions."17 4
The subsequent conviction of the Esquenazi defendants is currently being appealed.
One criticism of the Esquenazi defendants' "foreign official" challenge was that it was a
"greenhorn" effort. 175 With new counsel, the Esquenazi defendants presented arguments that
more fully addressed matters such as the FCPA's legislative history.176 The outcome of these
appeals is currently pending.
C. Aguilar
After Esquenazi, the next court ruling on whether employees of SOEs were "foreign
officials" under the FCPA occurred in Aguilar. As occurred in Nguyen and Esquenazi, the
Aguilar Court denied the defendants' motion. 177 Unlike the preceding case, however, the
Aguilar Court issued an opinion addressing the defendant's substantive arguments.
Central to the decision was the government's use of the surplusage canon.1 78 The
Aguilar Court characterized the idea of excluding SOEs from the meaning of
"instrumentality" as an "all or nothing" approach, because SOEs do not always share the
same characteristics as "departments" or "agencies." 179 According to the Court, the
defendants' logic "implicitly concedes some state-owned corporations can and do share the
characteristics of departments and agencies." 180 The Court also found, in dicta, that the
Charming Betsy doctrine was persuasive and the legislative history was ultimately
inconclusive. 181 The Aguilar Court also
avoided applying Nguyen and Esquenazi as
182
persuasive precedent to the case at hand.
While denying the motion, the Aguilar Court set forth non-exclusive characteristics
an "instrumentality" could share with a "department" or "agency" for FCPA purposes. These
characteristics include whether (1) the entity provides a public service; (2) the foreign

See Order Denying Defendant Joe Esquenazi's (Corrected and Amended) Motion to Dismiss Indictment for
Failure to State a Criminal Offense and for Vagueness, United States v. Esquenazi, No. 09-CR-21010-JEM (S.
D. Fl. 2010) [hereinafter Esquenazi Decision] (denying the Esquenazi defendants' motion).
173 Id. at 2-3.
174 Id. at 3.
175 Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, andBizarre: The ForeignCorruptPracticesAct Enters a New Era,43 U. Tol. L.
Rev. 99, 117 (2011).
176 Rodriguez Appeal, supranote 103; Esquenazi Appeal, supra note 103.
177 United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1120 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
178 Id. at 1114.
179 Id. at1115.
172

180 Id.
181

Id. at1117, 1119.

Although in its addendum denying the government's request for judicial notice that the SOE involved in the
case was a "decentralized public entity" and not a "corporation," the court does mention the government used
prior cases in its arguments.
182
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government appoints key officers and directors of the entity; (3) the foreign government
finances the entity; (4) the foreign government vests exclusive or controlling power in the
entity; and (5) the public perceives the entity to be performing official government
functions.183 The Court is, however, indefinite on when the existence of these characteristics
would make an SOE an "instrumentality." While attempting to clarify, it leaves the
importance of18 4 the factors unresolved and invites judicial formulation of other
considerations.
D. Carson
As in all of the preceding cases, the Court denied the Carson defendants' motion.185
Like Aguilar, this decision addressed the merits of the defendants' "foreign official"
argument. Ultimately, the Court determined that whether
a SOE is an "instrumentality" within
186
the meaning of "foreign official" is a question of fact.
Similar to the Aguilar Court, the Carson Court also listed several non-exhaustive
factors that may help resolve whether an SOE is an "instrumentality." The enumerated factors
are (1) the foreign state's characterization of the entity and its employees; (2) the foreign
state's degree of control over the entity; (3) the purpose of the entity's activities; (4) the
entity's obligations and privileges under the foreign state's law, including whether the entity
exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions; (5) the
circumstances surrounding the entity's creation; and (6) the foreign state's extent of
ownership of the entity, including the level of financial support by the state (e.g., subsidies,
special tax treatment, and loans). 187
Despite both providing factorial considerations, noticeable differences exist in the
reasoning of the Aguilar and Carson decisions. One difference involves the rejection of the
defendant's noscitur a sociis argument. Guided by the purpose of the statute, the Carson
Court found the noscitur a sociis canon inapplicable, as its application would work an
"impressible narrowing of a statute intended to mount a broad attack on government
corruption." 188 Another difference is that the Carson Court did not examine the FCPA's
legislative history. 189 Instead, the Court found the FCPA's language clear, its statutory scheme
coherent and consistent, and resort to the legislative history unnecessary. 190 The Carson Court
also did not analyze the CharmingBetsy doctrine that the Aguilar Court found persuasive."'

183

United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

1 See Dominique T. Fasano, Note, United States v. Aguilar: District Court Attempts Clarification of the

Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct By Further Defining "Foreign Official", 20 B.U. L. REv.. 489, 498 (2012)
("This [decision] begs the question as to what other characteristics would qualify a state-owned corporation as
an instrumentality of a foreign government, and if one had the characteristics provided by the court in the noted
case, when it would actually be an instrumentality of a foreign government.").
185 United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, *3(C. D. Cal. 2011).
'86 See id.
1'87Id. at 3-4.
188Id. at 5.
189See id. at 8.
190See id.
191See id. at 9 n. 14.
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Some key observations can be made about the differences between the defendants'
motions in Aguilar and Carson, and how the latter Court treated them. For example, despite
the Carsondefendants' rejection of dictionary usage, the Court nevertheless cites dictionaries
for a definition of "instrumentality." 192 Also, the Carson Court frames the issues in Carson,
Esquenazi, and Nguyen as the same, despite the Carson defendants' lengthy attempt to
distinguish its case from these prior decisions.193
One interesting aspect of the Carson decision is how the Court wrestles with the use
of "instrumentality" in other federal statutes. The Carson decision is the first time a court
addressed this argument. In the Carson decision, the Court states, "the defendants attempt to
apply the well known canon of statutory construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius or
similar variation to the FCPA, but these canons apply only within the same statute." 194 In
reality, the defendants attempted to apply the canon that, "Congress knows how to state" the
limits of specific wording. Application of the expressio unius canon is erroneous. Neither the
defendants nor the government mentions its applicability, nor would they, as both sides utilize
"instrumentality" in different federal statutes to support their arguments. It cannot be
determined whether this was an intentional or inadvertent mistake. The Court's
misapplication does, however, bolster its total rejection of the Carson defendants'

arguments. 195
E. O'Shea
When weighed against the lengthy Motions to Dismiss in Aguilar and Carson, the
motions in O'Shea offered considerably less analysis of the term "foreign official. 196 All the
general arguments are stated in the defendants' motion, but without in depth analysis. Instead,
the O'Shea defendant relied heavily on the Court to examine the Carson defendants' motion,
citing that motion twelve times in nine pages. The DOJ's response in O'Shea is equally
devoid of new arguments. The government repeated many of the arguments made in Aguilar,
recycling sentences from the DOJ's brief in that case.
The O'Shea Court denied the motion without opinion. 197 This may be a significant
blow to early FCPA defendants' challenging of the reaches of the term "instrumentality," as it
will go toward persuasive precedent on the subject. Since Nguyen, no court has dismissed a
defendant's challenge to the definition of "foreign official" without writing an opinion. 19s
Even in Esquenazi, where the defendants simply rewrote the legal arguments made in
Nguyen, the Court issued a written opinion. 199 The lack of even a brief written opinion in

192 See
193 See

id. at 4.
id. at 8.

Id. at 7.
This could also explain why the Carson decision addresses some the defendants' arguments and not others.
The unexamined arguments, like the legislative history, may have been too burdensome to explain away at
length.
19, See generally O'Shea Defendant's Motion, supra note 21; Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supra
note 27.
197 See Mike Koehler, O'Shea "Foreign Official" Challenge Denied, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-21 (discussing the O'Shea decision).
198 Id.
199 See generally Esquenazi Decision, supra note 172.
194
195
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O'Shea might indicate underlying judicial aversion to grappling with the language of a
historically non-litigated statute. The government's argument that the issue was premature,
and the failure of the O'Shea defendant to respond to that argument,
gave the court a means to
200
avoid the task of addressing the merits of the defendant's claim.
V. Observations
From these five judicial decisions, some important observations present themselves.
FCPA defendants' efforts appear to matter considerably. The Carsonand Lindsey defendants'
motions were significantly longer and provided more detailed analysis than any other motion.
In those cases, the judges issued written opinions addressing their legal argument. In contrast,
the O'Shea motion urged the court to look at the Carson brief numerous times to make the
defendant's argument. The motion was denied without opinion.
The O'Shea opinion further demonstrates the importance of adequately responding
to the government's prematurity argument. The O'Shea defendant neither addressed the
prematurity argument, nor the applicability of Hagner. Leaving this argument unaddressed
provides courts room to entirely side step the tough task of statutory construction. If
anything, O'Shea should serve as a harbinger to FCPA defendants choosing not to address the
government's procedural arguments.
Another salient observation is that potential FCPA defendants should not place the
lynchpin of their arguments squarely on the FCPA's legislative history. While the legislative
history is indeed a valuable and developed source of material for FCPA defendants, judges
have given it little credence. Only the Aguilar court analyzed the FCPA's legislative history
in dicta, ultimately declaring the legislative history ambiguous. 20 1 The Carson Court simply
avoided analyzing the legislative history altogether. 202
Instead of exploring the FCPA's legislative history in greater depth, FCPA
defendants should focus more attention on articulating the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem
generis canons. The judicial decisions appear to emphasis the defendants' use of these
canons. 20 3 One way FCPA defendants could bolster their position is by addressing the
government's arguments against these canons at the outset. It is foreseeable that the
government will respond to these canons by applying the canon against surplusage. 204 FCPA
defendants could use their initial motions to placate concerns that their view of the FCPA
would not devoid the term "instrumentality" of meaning. This provides defendants the
opportunity to reemphasize, rather than initially address, this point in their reply briefs.

The O'Shea court might have nevertheless been influenced by the "foreign official" challenge. Although
denying the motion, the O'Shea court went on to grant the defendant's motion for acquittal after the DOJ
closed its case. It has been posited the "foreign official" challenge may have been relevant to the court's
ultimate decision from analysis of subsequent hearing transcripts. See Mike Koehler, Did "Foreign Official"
Impact The O'Shea Acquittal?, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 11, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/did-foreignofficial-impact-the-oshea-acquittal.
201 See United States v. Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d 1108, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
202 See United States v. Carson, No. 09-CR-077-JVS, 2011 WL 5101701, *8 (C. D. Cal. 2011) (stating a
review of the FCPA's legislative history is unnecessary).
203See Aguilar, 783 F.Supp.2d at 1115; see Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *5.
204 See Government's Carson Opposition Brief, supra note 26, at 20-23; see also Government's Lindsey
Opposition Brief, supranote 27, at 12-14; see also Government's O'Shea Opposition Brief, supranote 27.
200
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Furthermore, there are some things future "foreign official" challengers should keep
in mind. The in pari materia canon should be avoided, as no other federal statute examined in
this matter has involved anti-bribery. Adamkus should also be distinguished as it will most
likely appear in future government briefs. Future FCPA defendants should note that extensive
effort to distinguish their case from prior cases may not be effective, as occurred in Carson. °5
Likewise, arguing against applying dictionary definitions to "instrumentality" may not be
persuasive. Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that a "foreign official" challenge may
leave a positive impression on the court by casting doubt on the merits of the government's
case, even if the court denies the motion.
VI. CONCLUSION

As the judicial decisions on this matter currently stand, the government's position is
favored. However, this should not discourage FCPA defendants. Only two courts have
provided substantive analysis. This note's primary theme has been to show that FCPA
defendants' arguments provide courts ample grounds to decide in their favor.
Barring Congressional clarification on the meaning of "foreign official," future
FCPA defendants should continue challenging the government's prosecution theories
involving SOEs. Judicial decisions on whether "foreign official" includes employees of SOEs
are simply too few to stop defendants from seeking the potential panacea this argument can
provide. Learning from these prior cases should help FCPA defendants in that pursuit.

205

See Carson, 2011 WL 5101701 at *8-9.
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